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MIRANDA, PLEASE REPORT TO THE
PRINCIPAL'S OFFICE
Meg Penrose*
[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is
for adults alone.'
The age of an alleged criminal offender undoubtedly affects his
or her ability to appreciate the consequences of confessing to crim-
inal behavior. Courts have long accepted that youth and inexperi-
ence impact an individual's ability to make a voluntary confession.2
Accordingly, this Article addresses whether Miranda v. Arizona-
the seminal Fifth Amendment decision providing procedural rights
to those enduring custodial interrogation 3-should apply to stu-
dents interrogated by school officials during school hours.4 To an-
swer this difficult question, this Article first provides a brief
overview of the law of minors and confessions. Next, it considers
the increasing law enforcement presence on our school campuses
and evaluates how this presence affects the role of school officials.
Finally, the high level of cooperation between law enforcement and
school officials in criminal law enforcement is considered to deter-
mine whether Miranda should apply in the principal's office.5
A. MIRANDA'S APPLICABILITY TO JUVENILES
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory
or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the de-
fendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
* J.D., Pepperdine School of Law; Managing Editor, Pepperdine Law Review;
LL.M., Notre Dame Law School. My experiences as a consultant to the United States
Department of Justice (USDOJ) Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion and the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children on school safety
issues served as the impetus for this article. I would like to thank my research assis-
tant John Rogers, my colleague Bernie James, and my dear friend Vivian Houng for
their guidance and advice on the piece. As the author, however, any errors are attrib-
utable to me alone.
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
2. See id. at 14.
3. 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
4. Id.
5. While due process considerations remain important in any confession or inter-
rogation analysis, this article will maintain a narrow focus on the application of Mi-
randa to questioning by school officials in schools.
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custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.6
On at least five occasions, the United States Supreme Court has
considered cases involving minors and confessions.7 The Court's
jurisprudence can be easily categorized into two main areas: cases
involving Due Process or voluntariness challenges to confessions,
and cases addressing purported Miranda violations in obtaining
confessions. In both contexts, however, the Court has clearly indi-
cated that there exists a distinction between minors and their adult
counterparts in evaluating whether the confession should be uti-
lized in criminal proceedings. As the Court emphasized in Gault,
"admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution."8
Lowers courts, also, have distinguished between youthful offend-
ers and their more senior peers.9 These same courts, however,
6. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
7. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004) (holding in a five-four plu-
rality decision that the Miranda custody inquiry relies on an objective test); Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979) (assessing, under the "totality of the circum-
stances" test, whether sixteen-year-old juvenile waived his Miranda rights); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967) (concluding that "the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to adults");
Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962) (prohibiting use, under "totality of the
circumstances" test, of confession obtained from fourteen-year-old boy who was held
by police for five days without access to his mother or other adult advisor); Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (precluding, on Due Process grounds, admission of
confession garnered through holding fifteen-year-old boy incommunicado for more
than three days, during which time his lawyer twice tried to gain access to him).
The Court's most recent pronouncement in Alvarado evaluated the Miranda cus-
tody question through the very limited prism of federal habeas corpus review. Alva-
rado, 541 U.S. at 655. Because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
severely delimits federal review of state habeas claims, the Court did not consider the
custody question squarely and without constraint. Id. at 665. Rather, much of the
opinion focuses on the narrow question of whether the lower courts unreasonably
applied federal law. Id. at 666-69. The important component of Alvarado, however,
remains Justice O'Connor's one-paragraph concurring opinion. Id. at 669. Although
four Justices found that while the youth of an individual may be relevant to the Due
Process voluntariness issue, they were unwilling to hold that age, standing alone, af-
fects the Miranda custody issue. Id. at 666-68. Justice O'Connor's brief concurrence
left open the possibility that "[tihere may be cases in which a suspect's age will be
relevant to the Miranda 'custody' inquiry." Id. at 669 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor's hesitation regarding the consideration of age and its effect on cus-
tody inquiries prevented Alvarado from becoming binding authority on lower courts.
Id. As her opinion reveals, Justice O'Connor's reticence to incorporate age as a varia-
ble in the Miranda custody issue in this particular case was due to the fact that Alva-
rado was nearly eighteen years old at the time of the interview. Id.
8. Gault, 387 U.S. at 45.
9. In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552, 555-56 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (reversing the
lower court's opinion that a sixteen-and-a-half-year-old's confession was voluntary
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have increasingly been willing to broach the germane issue of who
should be evaluated when assessing the voluntariness and admissi-
bility of a minor's confession. 10 Under Miranda and its progeny,
the consideration has been strictly limited to law enforcement of-
ficers-usually police officers. But, with the increased police pres-
ence in both public and private schools, courts must now address
the relationship between school resource officers (SROs) (those
police officers that are regularly scheduled to work at schools in
both a school disciplinary and law enforcement capacity) and the
teachers and principals who work in conjunction with SROs to
maintain safety, order, and discipline on campuses.
Lower courts have addressed this sensitive and synergistic rela-
tionship in the New Jersey v. T.L.O. search and seizure context,
but have not been as forthcoming in the confession arena where
students need greater protection. 2 Just two years ago, Justice
Breyer resurrected the concept of in loco parentis as it relates to
the intersection of school discipline and school law enforcement. 13
Generally, the transition in modern times has been to move away
from the more liberal approach taken in Tinker v. Des Moines'4
and toward an increasingly restrictive notion of students' rights in
the overlapping criminal law and school discipline context.' 5 Stu-
dents may retain their Fourth Amendment rights, though some-
what diluted, but their Fifth Amendment rights more readily fall
victim to the dual capacity of school official as part teacher, part
because his mother was barred from the interrogation that occurred on school
premises).
10. In re G.S.P., 610 N.W.2d 651, 658 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (finding twelve-year-
old "in custody" where principal informed student he must answer questions prof-
fered by police officer); In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 2002) (finding juvenile
should have received Miranda warnings prior to questioning by SRO at school).
11. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
12. Miranda specifically noted that modern confession protections are geared to-
ward psychological manipulation rather than physically oriented violations. Miranda,
384 U.S. at 448. Observing the shortcomings of confession tactics, the Court noted,
"[i]nterrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn
results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in the interrogation
rooms." Id.
13. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822, 840 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
14. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
15. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (finding that
random urine testing on students participating in extracurricular athletics does not
offend the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures).
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state actor.16 While courts recognize that school teachers and prin-
cipals are cloaked with power as state actors in the Fourth Amend-
ment scenario, their power as state actors in the Fifth Amendment
context is murky, at best. Coupled with this fickle state actor role
status is the dilemma that SROs continue to work in conjunction
with school officials to question students for law enforcement pur-
poses-not simply for school discipline purposes.' 7
At this juncture our modern precedent proves increasingly defi-
cient. School officials who question children in a custodial fashion,
having pulled the child out of classes where they must otherwise be
present, should not be able to shed their state actor status in order
to extract a confession that will be used by law enforcement of-
ficers for criminal prosecution. 18 While school officials should re-
main entitled to question students for school disciplinary purposes,
these disciplinary purposes frequently become subterfuges, if not
pretext, for the quick referral of minors to the local police depart-
ment and criminal prosecution. 19
Courts should take greater care in distinguishing the role of edu-
cators and SROs who engage in questioning of juveniles at schools.
While school "custody" may differ from police station custody,
courts must begin addressing whether school principal and SRO
questioning is the functional equivalent of "custodial interroga-
tion."20 Let us now assess the nature of the relationship between
school officials and their minor charges. If in loco parentis permits
stricter discipline and more invasive searches, then courts should
apply this same stringency to the questioning of minors and delimit
the collaboration allowed between school officials and law enforce-
16. Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E.2d 894, 900-901 (Mass. 2003) (stating that
school officials acting within their capacity as educators and not as instruments of the
police are not required to provide Miranda warnings) (citing Commonwealth v. Sny-
der, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992)).
17. In re R.J.E., 630 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd on other
grounds, 642 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 2002); In re G.S.P., 610 N.W.2d 651, 653-54 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2000); In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 332-33 (Pa. 2002).
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966) (summarizing the Court's hold-
ing as follows: "when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the
privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized") (emphasis added). While Mi-
randa's "in custody" assessment generally uses more restrictive language focusing
squarely on police officers, this more broad language provides ample guidance for
other authorities that also assist law enforcement with custodial interrogation.
19. See, e.g., In re Angel S., 758 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607 (App. Div. 2003) (student ques-
tioned by principal in presence of fire marshals).
20. See In re D.J.B., No. C3-02-731, 2003 WL 175546, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan.
17, 2003) (unpublished opinion).
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ment when the confession of a minor is at issue. Either school offi-
cials are state actors for Constitutional purposes or they are not. If
courts permit school officials and law enforcement to have it both
ways, whereby principals may search as state actors yet question
criminal suspects without being considered state actors, then the
final vestiges of Tinker's promise that students do not shed their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate has vanished.21
B. THE STATUS OF THE LAW: APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and
serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of
action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled
to incriminate themselves.22
In many, if not most cases, courts have been reluctant to view
school officials-even those individuals employed at schools as
SROs-as state actors falling within the ambit of Miranda. Rather
than considering the inherently coercive and custodial nature of
the school setting, courts frequently focus only on whether a rea-
sonable student would feel he or she was free to exit the inter-
view.23 It is naive to assume that an individual pulled involuntarily
out of class would feel capable of exercising the right simply to
return from where he or she was removed. This dogmatic applica-
tion, while consistent with the literal Miranda "custody" require-
ment,24 turns a blind eye to the reality that most students do not
recognize, much less exert, an ability to rebuff the school official's
inquisitorial advances. Thus, courts continue to take a constrained
21. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.") (emphasis added). Courts and commentators,
however, continually omit the specific First Amendment references from the re-
nowned quote and simply reference Tinker as a shorthand citation for the protection
of students' Constitutional rights at school. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist.
No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348
(1985).
22. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
23. Cf. In re Drolshagen, 310 S.E.2d 927, 927 (S.C. 1984) (finding there was no
custody because the student voluntarily reported to the principal's office, even though
the appearance was at the request of the investigating police officer).
24. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) ("Miranda warnings are re-
quired only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to
render him in custody.").
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view of Miranda's applicability in schools by assessing, under the
totality of the circumstances, whether a particular juvenile believed
he or she was "in custody" while being questioned by school
officials.
A relevant, oft-cited opinion, is In re Killitz.25 Decided in 1982,
this opinion considered whether a junior high student's incriminat-
ing statements made to a police officer during a school interview
violated Miranda.26 At issue was whether the juvenile defendant
had committed an off-campus burglary.27 The principal summoned
the student during school hours to the principal's office where an
armed, uniformed police officer interviewed the student in the
presence of the school principal.28 Neither the school principal nor
the officer informed the juvenile defendant that he was free to
leave or disregard their questions.2 9 Indeed, in finding that the ju-
venile was subjected to a custodial interrogation invoking the Mi-
randa protections, the court emphasized that the defendant "was in
school during regular hours, where his movements were controlled
to a great extent by school personnel. '30 Further, that "defendant
cannot be said to have come voluntarily to the place of question-
ing," because he would likely have been subjected to disciplinary
actions had he refused the principal's command to come to his of-
fice bore mention by the court.31 Based upon all these factors, the
court found that the juvenile had been subjected to a custodial in-
terrogation, precluding the admission of his incriminating state-
ments in subsequent criminal proceedings.32
Another significant opinion is In re G.S.P., from the Minnesota
Court of Appeals.33  G.S.P., a twelve-year-old, was accused of
bringing a gun to school when his backpack was left behind in the
locker room after a football game. 34 The following morning, G.S.P.
25. 651 P.2d 1382 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).
26. Id. at 1383 (setting forth the issue in the case as "invol[ving] the admissibility
of incriminating statements made by a junior high school student while being ques-
tioned in the principal's office by a police officer").
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1383-84 (observing that "[n]either the police officer nor the principal
said or did anything to dispel the clear impression communicated to the defendant
that he was not free to leave").
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1384.
32. Id. In reaching its decision, the court also considered that the juvenile had
been questioned as a suspect, not merely as a witness. Id. at 1383. However, this
consideration has not been uniform in school decisions and was not likely decisive.
33. 610 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
34. Id. at 653.
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was removed from class by the assistant principal and the uni-
formed school liaison officer, Officer Johnson." When G.S.P.
asked why he was being taken out of class, the assistant principal
said he would explain when they were in his office. 6 Once in the
office, the assistant principal informed G.S.P. that he "had no
choice but to answer the questions," and Officer Johnson informed
G.S.P. that a tape recorder would be on.37 The principal began by
stating he was going to ask a few questions and then "turn it over
to Officer Johnson. 38
In finding the interview tantamount to a custodial interrogation,
the court emphasized that "where, as here, a uniformed officer
summons a juvenile from the classroom to the office and actively
participates in the questioning, the circumstances suggest the coer-
cive influence associated with a formal arrest. '39 Further, the court
noted "[t]he record reveals that G.S.P. was questioned for poten-
tial criminal conduct, not just for misbehavior at school. The ques-
tions were reasonably likely to elicit a criminally incriminating
response."40 Thus, while noting that there is nothing wrong with
police officers participating in the investigation of school discipli-
nary issues, where the focus of questioning is to elicit criminally
incriminating information from a suspect, the protections of the
Fifth Amendment must be fully afforded.4 1
The crucial fact in G.S.P. was that the court found the school
official to be working in concert with the police officer. The court
believed that the interchange between the assistant principal,
G.S.P., and Officer Johnson constituted a single episode rather
than two distinct interviews.42 Like the Oregon decision in Killitz,
the Minnesota G.S.P. court held that "a Miranda warning must be
given by all that use the power of the state to elicit criminally in-
criminating responses. 43
Two state supreme courts have dealt directly with this issue.44 In
2002, in In re R.H., the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered
whether SROs should be considered "law enforcement officers"
35. Id. at 653-54.
36. Id. at 654.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 658.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 659.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552 (Ariz. 2004); In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 333-34 (Pa.
2002).
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within the purview of Miranda, where the SRO conducted a
twenty-five minute school interview of a juvenile vandalism sus-
pect.4 5 The defendant was removed from class during school hours
by the SRO.46 During the interview, the SRO asked defendant to
remove his shoe to compare it to footprints left in the vandalized
classroom, and then informed the juvenile defendant that he was
keeping the shoe for evidence.4 7 Not until the juvenile admitted
his involvement were his mother and the municipal police depart-
ment contacted.48
Finding that the juvenile student was entitled to receive Miranda
warnings under the circumstances presented, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court reversed the juvenile's adjudication of delinquency.4 9
In a fractured opinion with two dissenting and two concurring
opinions, the majority of the court agreed that because the interro-
gating school police officers were wearing uniforms and badges,
and because "the interrogation ultimately led to charges by the
municipal police, not punishment by school officials pursuant to
school rules," the SROs were deemed to be law enforcement of-
ficers subject to the strictures of Miranda.50
The most persuasive opinion in In re R.H., however, was au-
thored by Justice Newman, who wrote that courts should extend
T.L.O. "to the Fifth Amendment context and hold that the school
officials should give the student Miranda warnings when the consti-
tutional interests of the student outweigh the interest of the school
in solving the crime. '51 In addition, Justice Newman announced a
laudable test for determining whether juvenile interviews are cus-
todial when occurring on school campuses:
When weighing the constitutional interests of the student in this
setting, courts should consider the following factors: (1) the age
of the student to be questioned (the older the student is, the
more likely the information elicited from him in an interroga-
tion will be used against him in a court of law, rendering Mi-
randa warnings more necessary); (2) the ability of the juvenile to
understand the Miranda warnings, if they are given; (3) the
gravity of the offense alleged (likewise, the more serious the of-
fense the school officials are investigating, the more likely that
45. In re R.H., 791 A.2d at 334.
46. Id. at 332.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 333-34.
50. Id. at 334.
51. Id. at 348 (Newman, J., concurring).
[Vol. XXXIII
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he will be criminally charged); (4) the prospect of criminal pro-
ceedings, as opposed to merely school-related discipline; and (5)
the extent of the coercive environment in which the questioning
occurs.
52
As Justice Newman noted, "recognizing that the school setting is
sui generis, the school officials can demonstrate that the warnings
are not necessary if, after balancing the factors articulated above, it
was reasonable for them not to Mirandize the student. '53 Justice
Newman's balancing test provides school officials with the neces-
sary and time-honored latitude in dealing with disciplinary issues
that are truly school-related. Where, however, the focus of the in-
quiry is more criminally-related, the Newman variables provide
school officials with notice that Miranda is applicable and, accord-
ingly, should be respected. Without painting a bright line, Justice
Newman tactfully strikes the balance between the needs and pro-
tections afforded school officials under TL.O., and the increas-
ingly active law enforcement role that school officials are
voluntarily assuming in modern society. Under this view, it ap-
pears the traditional Miranda "totality of the circumstances" test
may be inappropriate for use in school cases.
The only other state supreme court to consider the issue of
schoolhouse confessions is Arizona, in In re Andre M., an en banc
opinion. 54 Although this case did not involve Miranda directly, the
court did consider the repercussions of excluding a parent from a
school interview where the parent has asked to be present during
the questioning.55 A sixteen-and-a-half-year-old juvenile was sent
to his high school principal's office to be questioned about his sus-
pected involvement in a fist fight.56 The school initially contacted
the juvenile's mother, who awaited further questioning of her son
by the police. 7 Thereafter, the juvenile's mother left the room,
having been assured that her son would not be questioned by the
police unless she was present or a school principal was designated
to sit in for her.58 Despite these assurances, the juvenile was ques-
tioned by three police officers and the mother was prevented entry
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. In re Andre M., 88 P.3d 552, 555 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc).
55. Id. at 553 (wherein the court "granted review to consider the standard for
determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's confession when a parent has been de-
nied access to her child's interrogation").
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 553-54.
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into the interview by another police officer, who was sitting outside
the interview room.59
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Arizona Su-
preme Court found that the juvenile had not voluntarily confessed
to the police, yet refused to adopt the juvenile's invitation "to hold
that if the police deliberately exclude a parent from his or her
child's interrogation, without good cause to do so, any resulting
statement must be suppressed."6 The court did, however, place
great emphasis on the fact that the juvenile's mother was intention-
ally excluded from the schoolhouse questioning. 61 While this deci-
sion may have little relevance to the more discrete Miranda
analysis, the case is important because it found that the failures to
"Mirandize" a student and to include a parent in an on-campus
police interview resulted in the suppression of an involuntary con-
fession. As previously discussed, confessions can be excluded from
evidence either under Miranda or Due Process voluntariness
grounds. In re Andre M. provides important guidance, because
courts will continually grapple with the issue of student
confessions.
Beyond the obvious factors of police/school entanglement,
courts scrutinize school interviews and assess custody by consider-
ing: (1) the age of juvenile; (2) whether the law enforcement figure
is in uniform, armed, and participating in the interview; and (3)
whether the juvenile was informed that he or she had the right to
leave the interview because she was not under arrest.62 Curiously,
however, courts do not seem concerned about the broad latitude
given to school officials to question students on non-school of-
fenses such as burglaries, sexual assaults, or other off-campus be-
havior. Courts should vigilantly assess whether school officials are
working in concert with law enforcement and thereby abandoning
their in loco parentis role. Likewise, courts should evaluate
whether the school official is tending to or inquiring about matters
59. Id. at 554.
60. Id. at 555.
61. Id. at 556. While the court recognized "that circumstances may justify, or even
require, the exclusion of a parent" in certain cases, this case was not deemed to be
one of them. As the court explained:
When, however, the state fails to establish good cause for barring a parent
from a juvenile's interrogation, a strong inference arises that the state ex-
cluded the parent in order to maintain a coercive atmosphere or to discour-
age the juvenile from fully understanding and exercising his constitutional
rights.
Id. at 555-556 (citations omitted).
62. In re Welfare of R.J.E., 630 N.W.2d 457, 460-61 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
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related to the safety, order, and discipline of the campus, not
merely the business of students and their off-campus lives. Aban-
doning the narrow focus of custody and opting for a more scrutiniz-
ing assessment of why a particular juvenile is being interviewed on
campus by school officials should preclude school officials and
SROs from immunizing their pseudo-law enforcement activities
under the guise of T. L. 0. and its progeny.63
Where the behavior is school-related and deals strictly with disci-
plinary issues, the Fifth Amendment poses no obstacle to school
officials furthering the safety and order of their charges. Unfortu-
nately, the current state of affairs often involves school officials
with non-school-related offenses and asks them to "assist" in inter-
viewing potential criminal suspects. Where the purpose of the in-
terview, even remotely, is to elicit evidence intended for use in
criminal proceedings, the dynamic of the exchange transforms im-
mediately into a setting where the Fifth Amendment and its full
protections should be afforded and honored. It is this latter scena-
rio where a silver platter doctrine equivalent should be applied to
prevent school officials from unjustly stripping juveniles of their
constitutionally guaranteed rights. 4 Schools should limit them-
selves and their investigations to school-related disciplinary issues.
Nothing in T.L.O., Acton, or Earls hinted that they enjoy any
greater powers.
C. INCORPORATING THE SILVER PLATTER DOCTRINE INTO AN
INCREASINGLY POLICE-LIKE SETTING
To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the gov-
ernment "to shoulder the entire load," to respect the inviolabil-
ity of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal
justice demands that the government seeking to punish an indi-
vidual produce the evidence against him by its own independent
labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling
it from his own mouth.65
The majority of cases assessing Miranda's viability on school
campuses bypass the important question of whether school officials
63. But see Jefferson v. State, 449 So. 2d 1280 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). No prob-
lem is presented where a student voluntarily presents him or herself at the principal's
office for purposes of confession to criminal behavior. Id. at 1281 (finding student
voluntarily reported to the principal's office thereby negating any need for Miranda
warnings). The focus of this article is the compulsory activity of school officials in
requiring a student to report to the principal's office for purposes of an interview.
64. See generally Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
2006] 785
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are working in concert with police officers to effectuate criminal
prosecutions of juveniles. The assumption is that school officials
are not working, either tacitly or patently, as agents of the police.
However, unlike the scenarios presented in T.L.O. and Acton,
many modern cases illustrate that school officials do work in tan-
dem with police to ensure that juveniles not only receive school
penalties for misbehavior, but also face criminal prosecution for
violating state criminal codes.66 While juveniles should not escape
criminal prosecution for criminal behavior, the mandates of crimi-
nal procedure should fully extend to juveniles who are interrogated
by the same individuals likely to participate in their subsequent
criminal prosecution. For better or worse, school officials are in-
creasingly becoming active participants in the criminal process.
Supreme Court precedent supports "the conclusion that ques-
tioning by any government employee comes within Miranda when-
ever 'prosecution of the defendant being questioned is among the
purposes, definite or contingent, for which the information is elic-
ited."' 67 In its holding, Washington's Court of Appeals quoted Pro-
fessor Wayne LaFave, who wrote that the "definite or contingent"
purpose for which information is elicited "will often be manifested
by the fact that the questioner's duties include the investigation or
reporting of crimes. ' 68
In recent years, schools have been legislatively required or have
voluntarily consented to participate in programs requiring the re-
porting of any behavior that, while possibly violating a school rule,
qualifies as a criminal offense.69 Schools now routinely collaborate
with police officers when a student is found to have drugs, drug
paraphernalia, or weapons which clearly violate both school regu-
lations and criminal law. 70 Schools also assist the police in investi-
gating allegations relating to assaults (fighting) 71 and sexual
assaults (incest or rape), 72 the majority of which occur off campus.
66. See discussion supra, Part B.
67. See State v. Heritage, 61 P.3d 1190, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
68. Id. (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.10 (c), at
624 (2d ed. 1999)).
69. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112(b)(1) (2001).
70. Id.
71. Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E.2d 894, 897 (Mass. 2003) (assault and battery
of fellow juvenile student off-campus).
72. There are many excellent examples of cases where sexual assaults occurred
off-campus but were investigated by school officials and police officers in an on-cam-
pus interview. See State v. Doe, 948 P.2d 166, 168 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997) (SRO re-
quested ten-year-old juvenile be removed from class where he was interviewed by the
SRO about an alleged sexual assault that had occurred off-campus, and the court held
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It is in these latter instances, particularly, that school involvement
cannot encompass anything other than pseudo-police behavior.
Non-school events that have predominantly, if not exclusively,
non-school effects should disqualify school officials from working
in concert with police officers without invoking traditional criminal
procedure protections.
Frequently, local school districts employ police officers with dual
assignments as both teacher and law enforcement officer.73 Courts
should not readily dismiss the police qualities these individuals pos-
sess and express while working on school campuses. Rather, courts
should accept that these individuals possess the full arsenal of po-
lice powers: search, seizure, arrest, and, most notably, interroga-
tion. It is time that our jurisprudence reflect the growing reality
that school officials, not just school resource officers, are taking on
a greater and more active role in their communities' efforts to
eradicate juvenile crime.
While the era of T.L.O. proved vital in making schools safe for
learning purposes by empowering school officials with the ability to
perform searches under the less stringent reasonable suspicion
standard, the modern decisions of Acton74 and Earls75 reflect a con-
cern that juvenile crime can best be quelled with the proactive as-
sistance of school officials.76 Yet, both Acton and Earls are
remarkable in that each decision ratified the suspicionless urine
searches at issue because the results were not turned over to law
enforcement.77 Instead, students testing positive for drug use in
each instance were required to submit to non-criminal sanctions-a
that his statements during this interview must be suppressed under Miranda). In re
J.A.S., No. A04-521, 2005 WL 44455 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2005) (unpublished
opinion); In re D.J.B., No. C3-02-731, 2003 WL 175546 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2003)
(unpublished opinion) (court held statements regarding off campus sexual assault
must be suppressed because juvenile deemed to be in custody where SRO interviewed
juvenile in a conference room at juvenile's school); State v. R.B., No. 41618-9-1, 1998
WL 729678 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1998) (unpublished opinion) (court found no
custodial interrogation where seventeen-year-old was interviewed for six or seven
minutes by a police detective at school despite fact that alleged rape took place off-
campus).
73. See National Association School Resource Officers, http://www.nasro.org/
about nasro.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
74. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-66 (1995).
75. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536
U.S 822, 834-37 (2002).
76. See generally Meg Penrose, Shedding Rights, Shredding Rights: A Critical Ex-
amination of Students' Privacy Rights and the "Special Needs" Doctrine After Earls, 3
NEV. L. 411 (2003).
77. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
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fact that should not go unnoticed.7s As school officials and SROs
take more initiative in eradicating crime on campuses, courts
should recognize the limited reach of T.L.O., Acton, and Earls.79
School safety can remain a paramount concern without resulting
in simultaneous criminal prosecutions. If school safety is the true
concern, something that is debatable at this point, then police in-
volvement is not relevant because the sanctions should be limited
to those required to keep students and school officials safe. But as
school officials and SROs continue to take a more active role in
working with police officers to provide police with information
gleaned from schoolhouse interviews, courts should evaluate
whether the "prosecution of the [student] being questioned is
among the purposes, definite or contingent, for which the informa-
tion is elicited." 80
D. THE FUTURE OF SCHOOL QUESTIONING
Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based
on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior
contact with the authorities, can never be more than specula-
tion; a warning is a clearcut fact.81
Chief Justice Warren summarized the decision in Miranda as
holding that, "when an individual is taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant
way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-in-
crimination is jeopardized. '82 It is time to assess precisely what
Justice Warren intended when he used the more amorphous lan-
guage "by the authorities" in summarizing this landmark decision.
The case was not likely intended to apply solely to law enforcement
officers in the most narrow, traditional sense. We know this to be
true through application of precedent extending Miranda's protec-
tions to non-police scenarios such as Mathis v. United States83 and
78. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833; Acton, 515 U.S. at 650-51.
79. See Penrose, supra note 76, at 433.
80. Washington v. Heritage, 61 P.3d 1190, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (emphasis
added) (citing United States v. D.F., 63 F.3d 671, 683 (7th Cir. 1995)).
81. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468-69 (1966).
82. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
83. 391 U.S. 1, 5 (1968) (finding Internal Revenue Service (IRS) civil investigator
who questioned defendant while the defendant was in jail custody on another matter
was required to provide defendant Miranda warnings for matters relating to the IRS
investigation).
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Estelle v. Smith.84 State courts have also mandated Miranda warn-
ings when park security officers questioned juveniles regarding
drug use85 and where police interviewed a juvenile at a children's
shelter.86 Thus, extension of Miranda outside the narrow arena of
police station questioning is neither revolutionary nor inconsistent
with past decisions.
Courts must begin considering the heritage of this great opinion
and evaluate whether present day school officials are more akin to
law enforcement officers maintaining a custodial power over stu-
dents' movements, or sufficiently distinguishable because school
officials lack the actual power of arrest. Courts likewise should as-
sess whether school officials are working in tandem with police of-
ficers to transcend the traditional safety, order, and discipline
environment of schoolhouses into the more accusatorial environ-
ment of police stations. If, as it appears, the tide is turning and
schoolhouses are becoming mere extensions of station houses, the
time is upon us to realistically view school officials in their modern
capacity as "the authorities," as fleetingly described in Miranda,
and provide students the full panoply of Fifth Amendment rights
protecting against self-incrimination. While school officials should
not be limited where questioning centers solely on matters of
school discipline, that world has seemingly passed us by. Now, in
order to combat the pressures inherent in the school setting "and
to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively ap-
praised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully
honored."87
84. 451 U.S. 454, 466-68 (1981) (holding Miranda applicable to psychiatric exami-
nation performed on defendant).
85. See Heritage, 61 P.3d at 1194-95 (relying heavily upon Mathis and Estelle to
find that, because arrest of the juveniles was "at least a contingent purpose of the
questioning, and one of the duties of the security guards was the investigation of crim-
inal activities in the park," the guards were analogous to traditional police officers,
mandating the application of Miranda). In Heritage, the park security guards were
found to be acting within their official capacity as city employees and were "wearing
bullet-proof vests under T-shirts bearing gold badges with the words 'Security Officer'
on them. Although they did not carry firearms, each officer also wore a duty belt
containing pepper spray, a collapsible baton, handcuffs, a radio, and a flashlight
holder." Id. at 1195.
86. In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276, 289-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ("Appellant was
isolated and alone during the police interrogation. This was despite the fact that the
shelter, through the Department [of Protective and Regulatory Services], had the
duty to care for and protect appellant.").
87. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 443.
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